Why Our Way of Discussing Budgets Must Be Reformed

The following appeared in an article at The Hill online

Republicans are betting that the public will be receptive to the Ryan plan’s measures to balance the budget in just 10 years, through lowering tax rates, $5.7 trillion in spending cuts and a repeal of the president’s healthcare reform law. 

 Of the three claims, one is partially true but misleading, one is false (in any reasonable world) and one is true.  The last one is true...the Ryan budget does repeal the President's health care law but the other two are misleading at best and false at worst.

First the misleading part...the lowering of tax rates.  Yes, the Ryan plan lowers tax rates and balances that with limitations on or eliminations of deductions in the current tax code.  Leaving aside my point of view on Ryan's tax plan, we should be able to agree that the average person, reading the words "through lowering tax rates" could be forgiven for assuming that Ryan plans to reduce government revenues to some degree.  Of course, as I've pointed out, this simply is not the case.  The Ryan plan proposes to increase government revenues by an average of 6.2% per year for the next decade.  It may well be that we should increase revenues more (as other budgets have proposed) but it is certainly not the case that Congressman Ryan has proposed cutting revenues.

Now the false part - $5.7 trillion in spending cuts.  There are no $5.7 trillion in spending cuts in the Ryan budget.  The budget proposes growing spending by 3.4% per year on average for the next 10 years.  Perhaps, some day we will realize that we can't grow spending by 3.4% per year while cutting it by $5.7 trillion.  Clearly today is not that day.

A Budget Comparison

Now that the House and Senate have passed their respective budgets, I thought it might be useful to do a comparison, at a high level, between the budgets.  The chart below provides a very simple way of looking at the budgets in aggregate, a level that is appropriate, given how unspecific budget resolutions tend to be.

Let's start with the spending side of the equation.  The CBO baseline has spending growth at 5.3% per year from 2013 to 2023.  The Ryan budget is at 3.4% per year and the Murray budget is at 4.8% per year.  All of these are higher than the projected rate of growth of inflation plus population.  Thus, real government spending per capita will increase under each of these budgets.  For example, under the Murray budget, real spending per capita grows from $11,229 in 2013 to $13, 697 in 2023.  In other words, even after accounting for the growth of inflation and population, the Murray budget spends about 20 percent more per person by the end of the 10 year period.

On the revenue side, the budgets are all pretty close.  The Murray budget increases taxes more than the Ryan budget (which basically duplicates the CBO baseline).  But again, all budgets grow spending far faster than GDP, meaning government revenues will expand faster than the growth of the economy.

What is interesting from my perspective is the 2.1 percentage point gap between GDP growth and forecast inflation plus population growth.  As I have discussed before, that gap is our budget opportunity.  A budget that grows spending at the rate of inflation plus population, while growing revenue at the rate of growth of GDP will always balance.  For example, starting from our forecast position in 2013, a budget designed along these lines would balance within 15 years, not quite as fast as the Ryan budget but a lot faster than anything else that has been proposed.

Misplaced Priorities and Wasted Time

Let's turn to the Republican budget from Congressman Ryan and the House Budget Committee.  At one level, based on my prior posts, one could think I'd be supportive of the Republican budget.  But, I'm not, at least not at any level beyond principle.  At the level of principles, tax reform is a good idea and the budget should be balanced by cutting spending, I find myself in line with the budget.  But beyond that level, I'm almost entirely misaligned.

In particular, there are four problems I see with the Ryan budget.

1.  Obfuscation - nowhere in the Ryan budget are there numbers comparable to the CBO numbers to allow for easy comparison between the Ryan budget and the CBO baseline.  This is a substantial issue for those who would like to have comparability between numbers.

2.  Military spending - the Ryan budget clearly increases "base" military spending, that is military spending less OCO spending.  In the Ryan budget, total defense spending looks to be roughly in line with the CBO baseline but this conceals a switch between "base" spending and OCO spending.  In other words, looking at only base spending, the Ryan budget proposes spending more than the CBO on defense.

3.  Entitlements - within the budget window, the Ryan budget does relatively little to address entitlements other than ending the spending associated with the ACA.  Medicare spending (net) is about $100 billion less over the 10 year period and social security spending is exactly the same as in the CBO baseline.  Thus, more than half of manageable (ex-interest) government spending is spared from any spending restraint.  As a consequence of this, Ryan is forced to make very difficult reductions in spending on the poor, a very bad tradeoff in my view.

4.  Taxes - Ryan continues to advance ill thought out and ill defined tax plans in his budgets.  The 10/25% rate and I'll figure out the $5 trillion plus of tax increases later argument is old, tired, and unnecessary.  Ryan could simply content himself with the notion of revenue neutral tax reform and leave it at that.  The tax plans have no impact on the budget whatsoever and thus are nothing more than wasted time in the discussion.  Tax reform will or will not happen in the future.  Offering some specifics without all of them causes much more trouble than it is worth.

So all and all, the Ryan budget is deeply disappointing, particularly since a budget that asked a little more of defense and spending on the elderly and ignored the tax discussion would have been a better answer and might have been more defensible, at least for those willing to engage in the debate.

Adjusting the Baseline and Changing the Message

This week saw the drop of three major budget proposals, from House Republicans, Senate Democrats, and the Congressional Progressive Caucus.  They are all bad for various different reasons.  And in particular, they are bad at the way they represent the numbers in their descriptions.  Each plays fast and loose with "the baseline" and various other definitional elements to make comparisons that are deceptive at best.

I'll be making several posts about the various budgets over the next couple of days.  I want to start with the "centrist" budget, the one from the Senate Democrats.  One major issue is the adjustment of the baseline to create false impressions.

From the Senate Budget,

Achieves $975 billion in deficit reduction through responsible spending cuts made across the federal

budget: 

• $493 billion saved on the domestic spending side, including $275 billion in health care savings
  made in a way that does not harm seniors or families. 

•   $240 billion saved by carefully and responsibly cutting defense spending to align with the
  drawdown of troops in our overseas operations. 

• $242 billion saved in reduced interest payments

Well, that's about 0 for 3 in terms of accuracy.  If we look at the CBO baseline, the Senate budget spends $197 billion less on interest ($5213 billion versus $5410 billion), $41 billion less on domestic discretionary spending ( $6356 billion versus $6397 billion), $626 billion less on defense ($5829 billion versus $6455 billion), and $26 billion more on mandatory spending ($28964 billion versus $28938 billion).  So if we restate into the categories used by Senator Murray and use the CBO baseline versus the one the Senator invents, we get:

• $15 billion less on the domestic spending side
• $626 billion less on defense spending
• $197 billion less on interest payments
• Total spending reductions of $838 billion

In other words, relative to the CBO baseline, it's a typical Democratic plan on spending...cut defense spending and leave everything else alone since any savings in interest payments are the result of tax increases or defense spending reductions.

At a macro level, the Senate budget is more accurate on taxes, claiming $975 billion in tax increases when, in fact, there are only $923 billion in tax increases.  But beyond describing ways the savings might be attained, the Senate budget proposal is silent on how these tax increases will be created.  In fairness, this is the same critique that is leveled against the House Republican proposal at a multiple of the size of tax increases required.

It is not the case however that the Senate budget increases taxes by $1.5 trillion as reported at the Heritage Foundation or National Review.  Yes, the budget contains discussion of replacing the sequester and other things but it does not include those things in the budget and thus it is, in my view, incorrect to claim that the budget increases taxes by more than it actually does.

So to restate, versus the CBO baseline, the Senate budget

1. Increases taxes by $923 billion with no specification as to where those increases will fall
2. Decreases spending on the military by $626 billion.
3. Gets the rest of its spending reductions from reduction in interest related to the two above factors

Hardly a "balanced approach" but entirely consistent with normal democratic priorities.

The lesson here is whenever you see a budgeter building a "bridge" from the CBO baseline to one they say represents "current policy," get ready for some quick spinning.

Another Way of Looking at the CBO Forecast

You wind up reading a lot of these days about budget cuts.  Indeed, in yesterday's New York Times, you had Steven Rattner making the claim that the President and Congress had already introduced trillions of dollars in spending cuts.  Using a chart from the CFRB, Mr. Rattner argues that, including the sequester, we have already had $2.8 trillion of spending cuts.  And yet, as I have noted in the past, the rate of growth forecast in the budget is 5.3% over the next 10 years.

As the same time, the President likes to talk about the need for "a balanced approach" by which he means more spending and more taxes than are already projected.  So let's look at the projection.  What's below is the CBO forecast expressed in real per capita terms using the census forecast of population and the CBO forecast for inflation.

In real, per capita terms, spending growth over the forecast average 2.5% and that's after the spending reductions in the BCA and the sequester.  Over the same period, revenues grow by 3.4% per year.  So Mr. Rattner's claim of spending cuts to the tune of multiple trillions of dollars flies in the face of spending growing faster already than inflation plus population.

And the President's request for "a balanced approach" is actually a request for spending to grow faster than 2.5% per year in real, per capita terms and a request for taxes to grow faster in real per capita terms than 3.4% per year.

Such are the perils of baseline budgeting and the language around budgeting that is used in Washington.

The Impact of "A Balanced Approach"

All the discussion from the President has been about the need for "a balanced approach" to the sequester which, roughly stated, means replacing half of the spending cuts with tax increases.  Let's leave aside, for the moment, that the other aspect of "a balanced approach" seems to be kicking the can to the future and focus for a moment on the impact on spending growth and tax rates of this approach assuming it were to happen.

For the purposes of this argument, I'm going to assume that this notion of balance applies to both the sequester and the BCA caps.  The reason I'm making this assumption is that, were one to believe the President's argument, it probably should.  After all, why allow caps to be all spending when you can achieve the same deficit reduction through a mix of spending and taxes.

To make the analysis simple, I'm going to focus on the last year of the caps, fiscal 2021.  In the CBO baseline, total government spending is forecast to grow by 5.25% on average per year.  Now what happens if we let the caps go.  Well, in 2021, the caps and the sequester restrain spending by $178 billion (Table 1-5).  But we are going to go halfsies so we'll raise spending by only $89 billion that year.  This then would take the growth rate of spending up to 5.46% and spending as a percentage of GDP up to 22.8% from the current forecast of 22.4%

Now on the tax side, let's make the assumption that all of the tax increases come from "the rich" and that this plan continues through the period.  In total, on a 10 year basis, this would equate to a tax increase at least as large at the increase that just went through on the top rate over 10 years.  That increase raised the effective tax rate of the top 1% of taxpayers by 3 percentage points.  We might rightly assume that this would do similar taking the effective tax rate of that group to 39.4 percent, the highest rate ever by a fair margin.

Such is the effect of "a balanced approach."  Spending back up over 23 percent of GDP by the end of the forecast, the highest effective rates in measured history (which I remind you only goes back to 1979 where there was a 70 percent marginal tax rate), and an accelerating deficit and debt to GDP ratio.

The Tax Rates of the 50s and 60s

You can't throw a stick without hitting someone saying that everything would be fine if only we would go back to the tax rates of the 1950s and 1960s.  Normally, when this point is made, it is in a discussion about income tax rates and how low they are.  I have often been perplexed by this perspective since I have always thought that total tax receipts were lower during that period.  So I took a look.


The top graph shows personal tax receipts as a percentage of GDP by decade historically from the OMB historical tables and the bottom graph shows the current CBO forecast of personal tax receipts from 2013 to 2023 (post the changes in the ATRA).

Two conclusions make themselves pretty immediately evident.  First, the personal tax receipts were lower in the 1950s and 1960s than they were in any subsequent decade despite the higher marginal tax rates that were in place during that time.  Second, projected tax receipts under the ATRA quickly outpace the average of any decade during the entire postwar history of the country.  So while one can always argue that personal tax rates should be even higher, it is very difficult to argue that based on a "getting back to the successful economy of the 50s and 60s" framing.

The next part of this debate is to deal with the distributional question, namely that personal taxes on "the rich" were a lot higher in the 50s and 60s.  This is also not true but more on that in the next post.

How much growth does it take not to "cut" spending?

Here's a nice quote from Speaker Pelosi today.

"The fact is we've had plenty of spending cuts, $1.6 trillion in the Budget Control Act. What we need is growth," Pelosi said in an interview on "Fox News Sunday." 

But of course, we know that spending in the latest CBO forecast is planned to grow 5.3% per year between now and 2023.  So we are to simultaneously believe that we are cutting spending by $1.6 trillion and growing it by 5.3%.  Of course, that 5.3% assumes the BCA caps hold through 2023, those same caps that the Congress is trying to get rid of for 2013 as we speak.

One is left to wonder how fast spending in Washington would have to grow before we would stop claiming credit for large spending "cuts."

Assume Everything Goes Your Way...

That's more or less my take on the current projections offered by the CBO.  To summarize and build on the work of William Gale

They assume:

1.  The economy reaches full employment/output by 2017 and stays there through 2023.  This both assumes rapid growth between now and 2017 and no recession or crisis between 2017 and 2023.  The budget outlook would markedly deteriorate were this not the case.

2.  Inflation remains low and (therefore) interest rates remain modest.  They CBO does assume a rapid climb in the real interest rate closer to historical levels (about 3%).  This would be welcome relief for savers but is consistent with the economic performance they are expecting.

3.  The savings in the BCA (the caps through 2023) hold, driving both defense and non defense discretionary levels to their lowest levels as a share of GDP since 1940 and 1962 (when tracking was started) respectively.  While, in my view, feasible and desirable, this is vanishingly unlikely.

4.  Health care inflation remains tame.  The CBO grandfathers recent trends in health care inflation into their forecast.  That's certainly possible but again it's an optimistic assumption given long term trends.

5.  The picture on the ACA does not deteriorate further and certain long term assumptions hold.  Among the assumptions in the ACA are the cadillac tax, the number of people in the exchanges, and the reduction in exchange subsidies beginning, I believe, in 2018.  Again, these are all optimistic assumptions.

And under these scenarios, the budget picture remains basically unchanged.  The debt to GDP ratio at the end of the period is slightly higher than it was in 2012.  The deficit is above 3 percent of GDP and nearly back to a trillion dollars.

I spend most of my time in business.  If you're presented with a plan that assumes everything has to break your way in order for you to move sideways, you know you are in trouble.  We are definitely (still) in trouble, despite about a 1 percent of GDP increase in tax receipts (between the ATRA and the end of the payroll tax holiday).

Real Budgeting is Still Better

As promised, I've updated my "real" budget projections on the basis of the CBO forecast that was just released (more observations from the CBO report coming up soon).  A quick summary of the assumptions and findings follows below.

Critical Assumptions

• Spending for each budget category grows at the relevant rate of growth of inflation and population.  Thus, Medicare spending grows at the rate of medical inflation (3.2% over the last 5 years) and the over 65 population (each year as projected by the Census)
• Tax receipts are as assumed in the CBO forecast
• Interest expense is calculated based on public debt and effective interest rate calculated from the CBO projections
• OCO spending assumed to decline to $50 billion and remain there
• Disaster spending rebased to $20 billion in 2013 and beyond
• Discretionary spending, Medicare, and Medicaid assumed to become 10% more efficient over the decade
• UI spending rebased to full employment economy per the numbers in the CBO forecast

The net effect of this is that all major class of spending grow, albeit most grow more slowly than in the CBO baseline forecast.  Medicare for example, grows at 5.3% per annum on average (including efficiency effect).  Defense (including OCO spending) grows at 0.4% per annum but continues to grow in nominal terms.

Meanwhile, revenue is projected to grow at 6.2% per annum.  The combination of these results in a rapid and continued reduction in deficit spending versus the CBO baseline.  I summarize the results in the two charts below.  First, we'll look at deficit to GDP ratios.

The basic change here comes in the medium and long term.  In the CBO forecast, the deficit picture deteriorates dramatically in the latter half of the forecast.  In the "real" baselines, the deficit picture continues to improve to 2023 ending the period nearly 300 basis points better as a percentage of GDP.

Not surprisingly, the debt picture is similar.  Instead of improving and then getting worse as in the CBO forecasts, the "real" budget picture continues to improve over the entire course of the forecast.  So the learning here remains.  A more restrained view of the growth of federal spending can dramatically improve the budget picture without making any major changes to the revenue side of the equation.

On the meaning of spending "cuts"

Have a look at this framing of future spending from the TaxVox blog at the Tax Policy Center.

Ryan’s promise to balance the budget in a decade with no tax increases implies cuts in federal spending unseen since the U.S. disarmed after World War II. Most lawmakers are horrified that the automatic spending cuts now scheduled for March would cut military spending by 9.4 percent and domestic spending by about 8 percent. (And note this so-called sequester would exempt Social Security and Medicaid as well as Medicare benefits from any cuts).

So I got to wondering about the nature of this "cut."  And I wanted to go back to the earlier post I had done on balancing the budget.  If you recall, I ended that post asserting that we would be running a deficit of about 1.2% of GDP assuming:

1.  We grew spending at the rate of growth of inflation plus relevant population

2.  We asked government (ex-transfer payments) to improve efficiency by 10% over a decade.

3.  We eliminated spending on the wars and brought "automatic stabilizers" back to their non-recession levels of spending.

So I wanted to revisit the draconian cuts argument.  In point of fact, the tax increases passed at the beginning of this year account for an improvement in the picture of about 0.4% of GDP so that would take our 1.2% of GDP deficit down below 1%.  So, if we did nothing more than have government grow "base" spending at the rate of inflation plus population, we'd get the deficit down under 1% of GDP by 2022 and on a trend to balance within a few additional years.

I'd also point out that the statement from the TPC is factually incorrect.  Let's say we reduced spending from current levels (22.8% of GDP in FY2012) down to the 19% that will be collected in taxes under current law by 2022.  That's a reduction of 3.8% as a percent of GDP over a decade.  From 1990 to 2000, spending as a percentage of GDP fell by 3.7%.  From 1991 to 2001, it was pretty much the same.  The comparison to WWII is highly inapt.  From 1944 to 1954, spending fell by more than 20% of GDP.  What the Ryan budget would set us up for is something like the 1990s and nothing like the period 1945 to 1955.  You'd think the folks at TPC would know better.

Is Paul Ryan the Only Keynesian Left?

I found this post at the always good TaxVox blog interesting.  It lays out the positions of the parties on reducing the deficit.  It contrasts the position of Paul Ryan (who wants to balance the budget within 10 years) with Democrats who seem to be focused on a stable debt to GDP ratio.

The Goal Line. But Democrats and Republicans don’t even agree on the goal line in this game. While Ryan wants balance in a decade, Democrats are not thinking about balancing the budget at all. Their aim: Stabilize the debt so it does not grow faster than the economy. This would set the ratio of debt to Gross Domestic Product at about 73 percent.

To return to the question I asked before.  How does Keynesian thinking allow for "stable debt to GDP" to be a target over a 10 year period of time?  Is it A) that economic cycles are now 20+ years long and therefore we are running deficits during the down side of the cycle to be offset by surpluses in the good side of the cycle or B) that liberals have surrendered the ghost of Keynes and the through cycle target is now a deficit to GDP ratio of 4 to 6% (the nominal through cycle GDP growth rate)?

It certainly looks like the latter.  So perhaps Paul Ryan is the only Keynesian left.  Wouldn't that be an interesting turn of events?

How the Mighty Have Fallen

Well, it's official.  Keysianism has jumped the shark.  I think it's worth reviewing the bidding here.

If we go back to the original theory of Keynes, yes there was deficit spending but it was supposed to be largely offset by running surpluses during good times.  Thus, through the entirety of an economic cycle, the debt was supposed to remain roughly flat.  In other words, under the original theory, while there would be deficits in any given year, there wouldn't be much debt accumulated over time.  In other words, the target deficit on average through an economic cycle was zero.

Several years ago, the terrain began to shift and budget theorists and politicians began to talk about the notion of "primary balance."  This notion is simple, namely that the budget is in balance with the exception of debt service.  What this means is that the budget deficit is equal to or lower than interest on the debt.  Since interest payments currently run about 1.5% of GDP, the notion of primary balance would imply running deficits under this level.  Note, this notion abandons a balance through cycle and proposed continued perpetual deficits, but small ones.

More recently, we've abandoned that notion as too restrictive and now begun to argue that deficits are fine as long as they don't grow the debt to GDP ratio.  Now this is even a higher standard of how much deficit is good since GDP generally grows faster than the 1.5% that current debt service accounts for.  This latter standard is the standard that is commonly in use among more liberal economists today such as Paul Krugman or the CBPP.

But until recently, I thought primary balance was a through cycle view just like the original Keynesian view.  But, based on this piece by Dr. Krugman today, I'm beginning to understand my error.  Krugman writes

Recently the nonpartisan Center on Budget and Policy Priorities took Congressional Budget Office projections for the next decade and updated them to take account of two major deficit-reduction actions: the spending cuts agreed to in 2011, amounting to almost $1.5 trillion over the next decade; and the roughly $600 billion in tax increases on the affluent agreed to at the beginning of this year. What the center finds is a budget outlook that, as I said, isn’t great but isn’t terrible: It projects that the ratio of debt to G.D.P., the standard measure of America’s debt position, will be only modestly higher in 2022 than it is now.
The center calls for another $1.4 trillion in deficit reduction, which would completely stabilize the debt ratio; President Obama has called for roughly the same amount. Even without such actions, however, the budget outlook for the next 10 years doesn’t look at all alarming.

So in the view of Paul Krugman and the CBPP, it's OK to do nearly nothing because the debt to GDP ratio (proclaimed the standard measure of the US debt position) will not increase very much between now and 2022.

But let's take a look at what the CBO expects from the economy over the 10 year period...in short rapid growth, full employment and low inflation for about 8 of the 10 years.  So the new standard is that slowly growing the debt to GDP ratio in an era of full employment is OK.

We've gone from saying we should run a surplus (Keynes) in good economic times to saying that it's OK to run a deficit of 3 or 4% of GDP, a rate that has rarely been seen outside of wars (Krugman).  My how the mighty Keynes has fallen.  One almost wonders whether he'd recognize himself in his newest incarnation.

Almost but Not Quite

Well, House Republicans are getting closer.  They've figured out that they need to pass a debt ceiling increase but they haven't figured out how to do it yet.

When you compare their approach to what I've suggested, you'll see two key deficiencies in their proposal.

1.  There's no principal behind the budget increase.  Validating the principal of raising the debt ceiling to cover committed funds is important and something that is clearly missed in the three month extension.

2.  Pushing the Senate to pass a budget resolution is a good idea but the enforcement mechanism (withholding pay) does nothing to ensure future debt ceiling increases proceed apace.  Rather tying future increases to the deficits in the budget resolution ensures a long-term solution to the problem as well as a short term one.

Congress is losing the opportunity to reform the way we design and execute the debt ceiling.  This is an opportunity that should not be lost.

A Potential Solution to the Debt Ceiling

I'd like to take one argument that I have heard a lot of folks, particularly on the left make, and use that to make an argument about how we might manage the debt ceiling.  First the argument and what I think is wrong with it.  You can find a simple version of it here.  Trying to ignore some of the invective, the crux of the argument is:

Obama has said he will not negotiate over the debt ceiling increase.  Good…I hope he sticks to that, because the debt ceiling shouldn’t be something that ever needs to be negotiated.  It shouldn’t even need authorization by Congress, it should simply be required that the U.S. Treasury have the capability to always pay the bills that Congress has already authorized.  The “trillion-dollar platinum coin” issue has been making the rounds as an option for Obama to bypass Congress if the GOP continues to play with economic disaster by making the debt-ceiling a political football. 

Now, the part of this statement is true is that Congress has already authorized spending that will push us above the debt ceiling but, in point of fact, it hasn't authorized very much, probably less than $300 billion.

1.  The Senate has not proposed and Congress has not passed a budget in more than 3 years.  Thus, there is no agreed upon spending blueprint for FY2013.

2.  The government is currently being run via a series of continuing resolutions.  The latest CR expires in March of 2013

3.  Assuming Secretary Geitner was correct that we hit the current ceiling on 12/31/12, this means that Congress has agreed to run the government for about 3 months post the passing of the ceiling.  Leaving aside timing effects, this means that the government would have about 1/4 of the annual deficit of say $1.1 trillion or about $275 billion to cover.

So yes, the government has agreed to spend $275 billion above the debt ceiling but not more than that.  Thus, the argument made by so many only justifies raising the debt ceiling by $275 billion.

However, there's the germ of a solution in the overall point.  I'd propose that Congress do the following.

1.  Immediately raise the debt ceiling by $275 billion dollars in what is called a "clean increase" of the debt ceiling.

2.  Attach an increase in the debt ceiling of whatever amount is required to the CR that much be passed prior to March 27.  In my view, I would increase the debt ceiling by 110% of the projected deficit created.

3.  Require that a debt ceiling increase be attached to each house's budget and that budget resolutions were the only way to raise the debt ceiling.  Thus, when each house passed its budget it would also be passing an increase to the debt ceiling and budget bills would be required to be passed, else the debt ceiling could not be increased.

4.  Finally, require a "true up" process at the end of every year.  That is, the ceiling could be adjusted for variance from projected costs and revenues but "only" for technical projections.  This could be done during the following year's budget process.

The consequence?  Well, the House, Senate and White House would have to agree on a budget (in order to increase the debt ceiling) and that increase would already be baked into law.  We might have to do some true ups when the economy tanks or thrives but, over time, those should cancel each other out.

Of course Congress would hate this because they'd have to pass a budget and they'd have to raise the debt ceiling showing how much debt they were adding every year.  But wouldn't this be much better approach to it than the current mess?

The (Not Quite) Worst Deal Imaginable

Well, I can say this for the current fiscal cliff deal.  It is not quite the worst deal imaginable but it does come close.  Here are some immediate and top of mind reactions.  I reserve the right to change some of these as more of the details come out but for now I think I can stick with...

1. It's mostly a "small" tax increase bill.  The net tax increase is being reported at about $600 billion  over 10 years.  That averages $60 billion a year against deficits that look like they are going to be in the $1 trillion plus range for the foreseeable future off of this baseline.  So we should prepare for our fifth straight year of deficit spending greater than a trillion dollars and 7% of GDP.
2. It gives away some of the benefit of "tax reform" before we've even gotten to tax reform.  It's hard to find exact estimates but the PEP and Pease changes probably raise about $100 billion or so in the 10 year window.  That's $100 billion of the $800 billion or so that has been discussed in "tax reform" discussions.
3. It makes a future "grand bargain" much, much harder.  The notion of a "grand bargain," that is tax increases for spending cuts was always a decent idea in the context of Washington but it would appear that idea is all but dead.  There's just not much one can do on tax increases now without increasing taxes on the middle class and thus the math of a grand bargain is simply not going to work.
4. It smells like a spending increase relative to the baseline.  The only report I've seen says "net" spending reductions are $15 billion.  But Congress includes reduction in debt service as a spending reduction and likely is using current policy as the baseline.  Thus, the debt service change (probably $60 to $90 billion of the $600 total) is probably counted as a spending cut meaning that spending, ex-debt service, most likely increased.

So is there anything good about the bill?  I can only come up with two things.  First, the reported permanent indexing of the AMT to inflation is a really good thing.  Assuming that stays in, it's a positive change from our perpetual patching process.  Second, the continuation of UI benefits is, from my perspective, also a good thing.  We can debate the merits of the UI system but putting some money in the pockets of people who have been employed is a good thing until we figure out a better unemployment system.  Sure it costs $30 billion but we could easily make that up somewhere else if we really wanted to.

And that's pretty much all she wrote.  Can kicking continues and looks like it's going to continue on pace for the foreseeable future.  There will be a lot of griping on both sides but in my view, Washington is simply incapable of dealing with the debt problem we have.  This latest event simply sheds more light on their (and our) dysfunction.

A Long Reply to Peter Orzag

Well, I don't get to post in the Washington Post but I do want to reply to Mr. Orzag's most recent column there.  Warning to all, this is going to be a long post as his is a long column with quite a lot of misrepresentations.

First, federal Medicaid spending is currently forecast to double by 2040, from 2 percent of gross domestic product to 4 percent. Under Ryan’s budget, it is projected to be cut in half over that period. This dramatic turnaround will supposedly occur by turning Medicaid over to the states through block grants. Anyone want to bet that will work? If states can’t find huge efficiencies in Medicaid, expect them to pressure the federal government to avoid the fanciful reductions in federal support assumed in the Ryan budget.

It's kind of interesting really.  This is nothing more than an argument that Mr. Orzag believes that Medicaid cannot survive on 3% per year increases in funding (which is what is in the Ryan budget) from the current baseline.  Mr. Orzag is entitled to his opinion and he may prove to be right but this hardly proves anything.  As I've written elsewhere, assuming the end to our slow growth period, as all forecasters have and assuming 1% annual efficiency in Medicaid spending, 3% growth in Medicaid is not a bad forecast over the next decade.  In the longer run, it may be worse but this is hardly the ridiculous assumption that Mr. Orzag assumes it to be.

Second, the Wisconsin congressman has specified $4.5 trillion in tax cuts, counting on massive rollbacks of tax breaks — such as the mortgage interest deduction — to pay for them. But he offers no details as to how to achieve such reductions, and most serious tax analysts don’t think such changes are politically feasible.

Let's assume this is true.  Mr. Ryan and Mr. Romney have specific two objectives, rolling back rates 20% and cutting deductions to offset.  My Orzag is making the assumption that the first objective will trump the second if they are in conflict.  He has no way of knowing this is true and, the projections in the Ryan budget actually appear to assume the first trumps the second sine the revenue line is revenue neutral to the current policy baseline.  Again, Mr. Orzag is offering no proof just the least charitable read he can offer.

Third, Ryan assumes that other spending, including nondefense discretionary spending, will fall from more than 12 percent of GDP last year to less than 5 percentby 2040. Again, he provides scant details on how to get there. 

This one is actually a bit funny.  Mr Orzag may want to read the President's budget at some point.  It assumes that total discretionary spending will fall to 5.0% of GDP by 2022.  The notion that Mr. Ryan might go from 5 percent to below 5% by 2040 doesn't really seem all that difficult to imagine.  You'd think as a past member of the Obama administration, Mr. Orzag might be aware of this fact.

Ryan says he would cut tax rates for all families, but that doesn’t mean the middle class would be any better off. Even after the Bush tax cuts, Ryan’s reductions would amount toabout $1,000 a year for families with annual incomes between $50,000 and $75,000— compared with a cut of more than $250,000 a year for those with incomes above $1 million.

This one is fun with numbers.  According to the TPC, the average family with an income of between $50,000 and $75,000 pays 5.7 percent of their income in federal income taxes (which is what is being changed here).  We'll charitably call that about $3500 per year.  This family is receiving a tax reduction of about one third, using Mr. Orzag's own estimate (which comes from the partisan CBPP).  The family with over $1,000,000 on average pays an average of about $600,000 in federal income taxes and receives about the same 1/3 reduction.  Thus, the gap in the amount saved is caused not by the unfair change in the tax code but by the gap in their current tax contributions.  As an aside, the tax rate changes in the Ryan plan do nothing to tax distribution.  It's simple math.

Furthermore, unlike the proposal from the nonpartisan Domenici-Rivlin deficit-reduction commission, the Ryan budget does not include any provisions to create jobs immediately. With unemployment above 8 percent, we should couple any long-term deficit reduction with additional support for the economy today. That would help the middle class more than promises of a tax cut that will probably turn out to be a mirage.

Oh dear.  So the Ryan plan is like the bipartisan Bowles Simpson plan in that it doesn't include immediate stimulus.  It is interesting that Mr. Orzag wouldn't mention the Bowles Simpson plan which his boss created.  With the deficit above $1 trillion already, perhaps Mr. Orzag should explain why the next trillion of deficits will do more than the first trillion. I'd also be curious if Mr Orzag would support all of Domenici Rivlin which, quite interestingly calls the same approach to Medicare as in the Wyden-Ryan plan (the current incarnation of Ryan's approach to Medicare).

“Both administrative costs (including profits) and payment rates to providers are higher for private plans than for Medicare,”the report said. That effect, according to the CBO, would outweigh any savings achieved by people choosing less costly health care.

But this assumption from the CBO is achieved by assuming that Medicare can continue to cost shift onto private insurance in perpetuity (which of course it cannot) and Mr Orzag also fails to mention that the plan would save the government a ton of money which the CBO concludes in the same report he cites.

Suffice it to say this piece which appears under the title "Five Myths About Paul Ryan's Budget" should probably be titled "5 Reasons Peter Orzag Has a Difference of Opinion with Paul Ryan."  To classify something as a myth typically requires demonstrating it is not true.  Mr. Orzag falls a long way short of that bar.

Ryan on the Ticket

Well, here's my obligatory post on the addition of Paul Ryan to the GOP ticket.

The good news, as others have commented, is that it seems likely that we will get a good policy debate on the role and future direction of the Federal government under way.  I think this is appropriate and good for the country.

The bad news is that reporters and pundits are really terrible at the way in which they report data.  Let me give you one example, here is Ezra Klein on the selection of Ryan.

7. Ryan upends Romney’s whole strategy. Until now, Romney’s play has been very simple:Don’t get specific. In picking Ryan, he has yoked himself to each and every one of Ryan’s specifics. And some of those specifics are quite…surprising. For instance: Ryan has told the Congressional Budget Office that his budget will bring all federal spending outside Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security to 3.75 percent of GDP by 2050. That means defense, infrastructure, education, food safety, basic research, and food stamps — to name just a few — will be less than four percent of GDP in 2050. To get a sense for how unrealistic that is, Congress has never permitted defense spending to fall below three percent of GDP, and Romney has pledged that he’ll never let defense spending fall beneath four percent of GDP. It will be interesting to hear him explain away the difference.

And while what Ezra says is true, it's terribly incomplete.  A few things to think about to put the oft bandied about 3.75% number in context.

First, the President's budget submission puts future discretionary spending at 5.0% of GDP by 2022 down from 8.7% of GDP in 2011.  Now, somehow, the difference from 5 to 3.75 doesn't seem quite as far as the difference between 8.7 and 3.75.

Second, let's do a little extrapolation exercise.  Suppose that real, per capita GDP growth averaged 1% between 2022 and 2050.  This is a good bit below the long term historical average but let's just assume it was.  And let's assume that discretionary spending grows at the rate of inflation plus population over that same period.  Care to guess what percent of GDP it would be in 2050?  How about 3.78%.

So, in effect, what Ryan is assuming is that spending will grow as 100 basis points slower than GDP growth on average in the long run.  A crazy assumption?  Horrible austerity?  Doesn't seem like either to me.

The question therefore is whether the actual facts will become known.  I'm not optimistic but the chances are higher today than they were yesterday.

Principled Taxation

Having dealt with the principles underlying spending, let's turn to the topic of taxation.  Again, in my opinion, three principles are sufficient to help us design our tax code.

1. The tax code should pay for the spending we do.  This is particularly true of what we call the "base" spending.  A tax code that does not cover the spending we do is of no use from a budgetary perspective.
2. The tax code should be as simple as possible.  There is no reason for the extremely large numbers of exceptions, rate, alternative rates and so forth in the tax code.  This type of behavior is simply a giveaway by legislators to preferred constituencies of all types.
3. Income below a certain threshold should not be subject to tax.  It is entirely true that some income should be shielded from taxation since that income is necessary for subsistence.

In following these three principles, what type of tax code would we get?  Basically, we would wind up with a tax code that exempts income below a certain threshold, say 1.5 times the poverty level and has a single rate above that threshold.  This rate would apply to all income and would replace all personal income taxes, including the current FICA tax.

Some might object to taxing capital income at the same rate as wage income.  To me, there is an interesting debate to be had on this topic but that debate should occur on the corporate income tax side of the ledger.  Making the personal code more complex because of an argument about the corporate tax code to me makes relatively little sense.  Furthermore, the notion that capital income requires preferential treatment seems to me out of keeping with the current environment for capital (e.g., a very fluid, global, capital system).

Others might object that this system is not "progressive" because there is only one tax rate.  Of course, the outcomes are progressive (meaning the effective tax rates are progressive) despite the fact that the rate table is not.  

Finally, some would object that this type of a system would eliminate refundable credits, basically payments made through the tax code.  My argument is that these payments, should they be necessary, should simply be made through expenditures rather than through the manipulation of the tax code.

What would the rate need to be to make this type of a tax code work?  More on that in the next post when we run the numbers.

Principled Spending

Well, it took me a lot longer than I had thought it would to come back to this but I did want to return to the principled view on taxes and spending.  As I said I would, let's start with spending and what the principles are that we might use and what they might mean.

So what are the principles we could use for spending?  I'd say there are really only 3.

1.  Government spending should grow no faster than the historical rate of inflation plus “relevant population growth.”  It is critically important to argue that government should be on a COLA the same way that our seniors are.  Why should government be able to expand its budget faster than anyone else simply because it perpetually borrows the difference?
2. Government may still institute “emergency” spending during recessions but this spending will be accounted for separately and brought to zero as the economy improves.  Explicit countercyclical spending should in fact be accounted for separately.  Failure to do this is what has allowed the budget to expand under President Obama.  The stimulus was baked into the baseline, a terrible mistake from the standpoint of fiscal responsibility.
3. This COLA approach (excluding any emergency spending) will form the new baseline for government spending from which we will attempt to drive even greater efficiency.  In other words, the COLA approach serves as a ceiling rather than a floor for spending (ex-emergencies).

Let's explore these a bit more in depth.  As to the first, we should ask our politicians to set some threshold that isn't a baseline for how fast government should grow.  As a cost center, government shouldn't need to grow faster than the population it serves plus the rate of inflation.  In fact, growth at inflation plus population more or less assumes no positive returns to scale.

Principle 2 is equally important for fiscal sustainability.  The government should differentiate emergency spending from baseline spending with the assumption that emergency spending will be reduced to zero once the emergency has ended.  Overseas Contingency Operations (the wars) are a good example of this but so are automatic stabilizers (like extended unemployment insurance).  Without an assumption that these emergencies go to zero, we never can differentiate whats "in the base" from what's "temporary."  Putting things in the temporary bucket ties them to external events.

Finally, the third principle is what we the people ultimately ask government to do on our behalf.  The more efficiency we demand from government (or the more economies of scale we believe exist), the more we should ask for a rate of growth below the "COLA baseline."

These principles may seem small but in point of fact their application would dramatically improve our fiscal position, a point I will cover after we cover tax principles in the next post.